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Abstract:  Although corruption and tax evasion are distinct and separate problems, they can 
easily become intertwined and reinforcing. A society that is more corrupt may enable more tax 
evasion as corrupt officials seek more income via bribes; conversely, higher levels of tax evasion 
may drive corruption by offering more opportunities for bribes. While a large body of work on 
each subject separately has emerged, the relationship between the two problems has remained a 
largely unexplored area. In particular, there is no theoretical work that examines the relationship 
between corruption and firm tax evasion, focusing on how the potential for bribery of tax 
officials affects a firm’s tax evasion decisions, and there is no empirical work that examines 
these linkages. This paper develops a theoretical model that incorporates the potential for bribery 
in a firm’s tax reporting decisions, and then tests the main results of the theory using firm level 
information on reporting obtained from the World Enterprise Survey and the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. Estimation methods include both instrumental 
variable methods and propensity score matching methods, and also control for potential 
endogeneity of evasion and corruption. Results demonstrate that it is corruption that largely 
drives higher levels of evasion; that is, corruption of tax officials is a statistically and 
economically significant determinant of tax evasion. Tax inspectors who request bribes result in 
reduction of sales reported for taxes of between 4 and 10 percentage points. Additionally, larger 
bribes result in higher levels of evasion, at least up to some point. These results indicate that 
governments seeking to increase their tax revenues must work first to ensure an honest tax 
administration. 
 
 
Keywords: Tax compliance; corruption. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: H26; H32; D7. 
 
2 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption and tax evasion are not new problems, and both are significant problems 
facing today’s economies. While these issues are distinct and can exist without each other, they 
can easily become intertwined and reinforcing. A society that is more corrupt may enable more 
tax evasion as corrupt officials seek more income via bribes; conversely, higher levels of tax 
evasion may drive corruption by offering more opportunities for bribes. While a large body of 
work on each subject separately has emerged, the relationship between the two problems has 
remained a largely unexplored area. In particular, there is no theoretical work that examines the 
relationship between corruption and firm tax evasion, focusing on how the potential for bribery 
of tax officials affects a firm’s tax evasion decisions, and there is no empirical work that 
examines these linkages. This paper develops a theoretical model that incorporates the potential 
for bribery in a firm’s tax reporting decisions, and then tests the main results of the theory using 
unique firm level information on reporting. Empirical tests that control for potential endogeneity 
of evasion and corruption demonstrate that it is corruption that largely drives higher levels of 
evasion. 
It is useful at the start to clarify terms. Governments have a natural monopoly over the 
provision of many publicly provided goods and services, and a selfless and impartial government 
official would provide these services efficiently at their marginal cost. However, it has long been 
recognized that public officials are often self-seeking, and such officials may abuse their public 
position for personal gain. These actions include such behavior as demanding bribes to issue a 
license, awarding contracts in exchange for money, extending subsidies to industrialists who 
make contributions, stealing from the public treasury, and selling government-owned 
commodities at black-market prices.  In their entirety, these actions can be characterized as 
abusing public office for private gain, or “corruption” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). However, 
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despite the widespread recognition of corruption, it is only recently that systematic analyses of 
its causes and its effects have been undertaken.
1
 
“Tax evasion” is a related but clearly different concept, and refers to illegal and 
intentional actions taken by individuals to reduce their legally due tax obligations.  Individuals 
can evade income taxes by underreporting incomes; by overstating deductions, exemptions, or 
credits; by failing to file appropriate tax returns; or even by engaging in barter. Most often these 
actions are viewed through the lens of individuals via the individual income tax, and in fact most 
all theoretical and empirical work on tax evasion has focused on the individual income tax. 
However, these types of action can clearly be taken in other taxes. For example, in the corporate 
income tax, firms can underreport income, overstate deductions, or fail to file tax returns, just as 
individuals do in the individual income tax. Similarly, indirect taxes like the value-added tax 
(VAT) present numerous opportunities for evasion; indeed, firms can simply fail to register for 
the VAT, underreport sales, or they can present fraudulent invoices that allow them to understate 
their tax liabilities. However, with some exceptions (Wang and Conant 1987; Crocker and 
Slemrod 2005; Goerke and Runkel 2006), the basic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model used 
in nearly all research on tax compliance has focused on the individual, and not the firm. For 
obvious reasons, empirical work has proven to be quite challenging, given the lack of reliable 
                                                          
1
 See Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), Klitgaard (1988), Bardhan (1997) Fiorentini and Zamagni (1999), and Jain 
(2001) for earlier discussions of the causes and the consequences of corruption; more recent discussions are in 
Svensson (2005) and Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna (2012). There is now a large literature that examines the 
various effects of such corruption. For example, there is some work that suggests that corruption “greases the 
wheels” of commerce as bribers grow into entrepreneurs who spur development (Leys 1965; Bardhan 1997). There 
is other work that argues that corruption creates serious inefficiencies in the economy, resulting in a wide range of 
adverse effects (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Empirical work largely supports the latter view of corruption, 
confirming that it can result lower growth and investment (Mauro 1995; Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang 
2013). There is also work on such issues as the determinants of corruption (Treisman 2000; Mocan 2008), the 
effects of corruption on government revenue (Mookherjee 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997, 2001; Johnson and 
Kaufman 1999; Sanyal, Gang, and Goswami 2000; Ghura 2002; Attila 2008), the growth effects of corruption 
(Barreto and Alm 2003; Cerqueti and Coppier 2010), and the ways in which fiscal decentralization affects 
corruption (Fisman and Gatti 2002), among other things. 
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information on taxpayer compliance. Even here, the limited amount of empirical work has 
likewise largely examined individual evasion of the individual income tax.
2
 
Despite all of this work on corruption and on tax evasion, there is very little work on their 
interrelationship, especially as this relates to firms. Existing theoretical analysis that combines 
corruption and evasion focuses not on firms but on households (Chander and Wilde 1992; Besley 
and McLaren 1993; Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999; Acconcia, D’Amato, and Martina 2003; 
Akdede 2006). A notable exception here is Goerke (2008), who examines the firm's corruption 
decision in the presence of tax evasion; however, his focus is on firm corruption activities that 
are not related to evasion, and indeed he finds that evasion has no bearing on the firm's bribery 
decision. The limited amount of empirical work on firm tax evasion (Rice 1992; Murray 1995; 
Alm, Blackwell, and McKee 2005) focuses exclusively on firm tax evasion, with no recognition 
of the ways in which firm evasion may affect, or be affected by, corruption. To our knowledge, 
only Uslaner (2007) examines empirically the relationship between corruption and evasion, 
focusing exclusively on a limited number of transition countries in 2002 and 2005, and he finds 
corruption to be an important factor that negatively affects the decision to pay taxes. 
In this paper we contribute to both theoretical and empirical research on corruption and 
evasion, first by developing a theoretical model of firm reporting when bribery is an option for 
the firm, and then by empirically investigating whether corruption leads to greater levels of firm 
tax evasion. In our theoretical model, a firm chooses how much to report, when bribing a corrupt 
official is also an option.  In our empirical work we use detailed firm-level data gathered by the 
World Bank over multiple countries and years, the World Enterprise Survey (WES) and Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which include measures of firm 
reporting. We employ both instrumental variables methods and propensity score matching 
                                                          
2
 See Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Sandmo (2005, 2012), 
Slemrod (2007), Torgler (2007), and Alm (2012) for comprehensive surveys and assessments of the evasion 
literature. See especially Slemrod and Weber (2012) for a discussion of the challenges of empirical work. 
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techniques in order to estimate the relationship between corruption and tax evasion, including as 
explanatory variables those that capture the main drivers of evasion and corruption. 
Our estimation results indicate that corruption of tax officials is a statistically and 
economically significant determinant of tax evasion. Tax inspectors who request bribes result in 
reduction of sales reported for taxes of between 4 and 10 percentage points. Additionally, larger 
bribes result in higher levels of evasion. These results give support to the argument that tax 
compliance is dependent on the quality of the tax enforcers. However, while corruption increases 
tax evasion, very high levels of corruption can create an atmosphere conducive to compliance. If 
the costs of evading taxes grow greater than the costs of paying taxes, then a rational firm can 
simply comply with the law and avoid paying bribes. As a result, in situations in which the firm 
must pay a bribe rate to corrupt officials in excess of the tax rate, firm evasion begins to fall. 
These results indicate that governments seeking to increase their tax revenues must work first to 
ensure an honest tax administration. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we develop a theoretical model of the firm’s decisions to pay or to evade 
taxes when bribery of government officials is also a possibility. A firm is assumed to earn a total 
income of Y, which it can either declare to the authorities D or attempt to hide E, so 
      (1)  
The firm faces a risky gamble based on the probability p of being audited by the authorities. If it 
is not audited (“NA”) with probability (1-p), then the firm receives an income of: 
           (   )
  (2)  
where τ is the tax rate on income declared and h0 is the costs of evasion such as keeping two sets 
of book or hiring lawyers or accountants to help hide income. Costs are assumed to be increasing 
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with the square of the amount of money being hidden because larger hidden sums require more 
resources (e.g., holding cash in Swiss bank accounts is more expensive than hiding cash under a 
mattress).  
Now consider the possibility of bribing a corrupt official.  If the firm is audited with 
probability (1-q) by a non-corrupt or “straight” official (“AS”), then it is fined and its resulting 
income is: 
           (   )    (   )
   (3)  
where the firm must pay taxes at the tax rate of τ and fines at the fine rate of π on the 
evaded/detected taxes. Note that resources used in hiding the income are lost even in the event 
that the bribery is not successful. Suppose instead that the firm faces the possibility of bribing a 
corrupt official, where the probability of being audited by a corrupt official is q. In a system with 
corruption, the firm faces a corrupt official who is willing to take a bribe to enable the firm’s tax 
evasion, in which case the firm’s income with audit (“AC”) is defined as: 
            ( )  (   )
   
with 
  ( )
  
     ( )        
(4)  
where B is the bribe paid to the official and f(B) is the factor by which bribing the official 
reduces the costs of hiding income. This factor is decreasing in B, as larger bribes should buy 
bigger reductions in the costs of evasion. Defining B and f(B) and substituting into equation (4) 
redefines IAC as: 
     (   ) 
        
(5)  
 ( )  (   )  (6)  
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            (   )  (   )
   (   )
  (4)’ 
Following Besley and McLaren (1993), θ is the fraction of the tax and fine liability paid as a 
bribe and represents the tax inspector's bargaining power, and the benefit of bribery f(B) is 
assumed to be dependent on this bargaining power, as adjusted by α, which represents the 
effectiveness of the corrupt official in reducing costs. This parameter can encompass a wide 
range of factors including the level of enforcement of anti-corruption laws, the general level of 
corruption in a country, or even firm specific circumstances.
3
 In a very corrupt country, the bribe 
may be sufficient to fully eliminate evasion costs; the corrupt official takes the bribe and ignores 
the taxpayer. In a more honest or vigilant society, the corrupt official may be able to mitigate the 
evasion costs, but the taxpayer must still incur some costs in order to completely hide evasion.  
There are as a result three potential income levels, which can be placed in an expected 
utility framework with associated probabilities: 
 ( )     (   )  (   )  (   )  (   ) (   ) (7)  
where p is the probability of being audited, q is the probability of being audited by a corrupt tax 
inspector, and (1-q) is the probability of being audited by a non-corrupt inspector. The firm’s 
problem is to maximize expected utility by deciding what amount of income to declare. 
Substituting the appropriate equations and maximizing (7) with respect to D results in a 
first-order condition of: 
  ( )
  
     
  
    
     
  
 (   )  
  
    
    
  
 (   )
  
    
    
  
 (8)  
                                                          
3
 For example, a U.S. multinational company operating in a corrupt environment may engage in bribery to avoid 
local taxes, but it would still need to use additional resources to circumvent U.S. laws against corruption, such as the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In this case, the corrupt tax official’s effectiveness in abetting evasion is limited to 
only what he or she can do in the home country.  
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          (   )(   )
   (   ) 
  
    
         (   ) 
 (   )
  
    
    (   )     
   
 
Note that the second derivative of   with respect to D is less than zero, indicating a maximum: 
  
  
   
   
    
 
          (   )(   )
      
  
    
(    (   )
 )
 (   ) 
   
    
 
          (   ) 
  (   ) 
  
    
(    )
 (   )
   
    
 
    (   )    
  (   )
  
    
(    ) 
           (9)  
The optimal amount of declared income can therefore be defined as: 
    (                ) (10)  
Equation (8) also implicitly defines the optimal amount of declared income D* as a 
function of the corruption variables q, α, and θ. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the 
comparative statics of these variables are given by:  
  
  
( )
  
  
    
          (   )(   )
  
( )
  
  
    
         (   ) 
( )
 (11)  
  
  
( )
             (   )(   )
  
   
    
 (   (   )   (   )
     (   )
 )
( )
    
  
    
 (     (   )(   )
   )
( )
 
(12)  
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( )
   (         (   )(   )
 
   
    
 
(   (   )
   (   ) (   ) )
( )
   
  
    
(   (   )   (   ) (   )
 )
( )
 
(13)  
Given that the sign of the derivative of   with respect to q (or the probability of being audited by 
a corrupt official) is negative while the sign is ambiguous for α (or the effectiveness of the 
corrupt official in reducing costs) and for θ (or the fraction of the tax and fine liability paid as a 
bribe), then the signs of the comparative statics effects are given by: 
  
  
   
  
  
  
( )
( )
 (14)  
  
  
   
  
  
  
( )
( )
 (15)  
  
  
   
  
  
  
( )
( )
 (16)  
Note that income from a crooked audit will always exceed that from a straight audit. Should a 
corrupt tax inspector attempt to extort an amount greater than the tax and fines on the evaded 
amount, the taxpayer could simply approach a straight tax inspector and pay the full tax and fine 
owed. As a result, the bribe rate plus the reduced evasion costs associated with the bribe will 
always be less than the fine/tax rate on evaded income plus the full costs of evasion. In this 
respect, businesses will always prefer to be audited by a crooked auditor, and a firm will always 
decrease its reported income as the probability of audit q by a corrupt auditor increases. 
The auditor's bargaining power and bribery effectiveness have more ambiguous results on 
declared income. These two variables serve to change the “price” of tax evasion, with larger 
bribes and more effective bribes, as represented by higher values of θ and α, respectively, 
reducing the costs of tax evasion. As the size of the bribe grows, the change in price of tax 
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evasion has an income and substitution effect on the amount of income declared, and the 
conflicting income and substitution effects create ambiguity in the comparative statics. 
For example, consider equation (12), which gives the effects of the bribe amount on 
declared income. The income effect is represented by the first term of equation (12). As 
disposable income grows due to the lower costs of evasion from the larger bribe, declared 
income will also increase. Declaring more income creates more certainty, thus declared income 
is a normal good. However, while the increase in income from falling costs of evasion is 
positive, the bribe must be paid to the corrupt authority. Paying the bribe offsets the income 
gains from the cost of evasion reduction and thereby reduces the amount of declared income. 
These two countervailing effects serve to create ambiguity with regard to the overall effect of the 
bribe rate on declared income. The substitution effect from the relative price change between 
declared and undeclared income due to the bribe size is represented by the second term of 
equation (12). As the costs of evasion fall, the relative price of declaring income increases. This 
results in the substitution of evaded income for declared income as indicated by the negative sign 
of the substitution effect. Given the ambiguity of the income effect and the impossibility of 
determining which effect dominates, the total effect of changing the bribe size on declared 
income is theoretically ambiguous. 
A similar analysis applies to the effects of α (or the effectiveness of the corrupt official in 
reducing costs) on declared income. A change in α also results in a change in the costs of 
evasion, with higher values resulting in lower evasion costs. The more effective a corrupt official 
is at reducing the costs, the lower the costs will be. The resulting change in declared income is 
also subject to income and substitution effects. Unlike a change in the bribe size, increasing 
officials’ effectiveness only creates a decrease in the costs of evasion, which results in higher 
income. Because the firm receives all the benefit from this income increase, the effect on 
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declared income is unambiguously positive. Since declared income is a normal good, then the 
resulting increase in income will reduce tax evasion. Counterbalancing this income effect is a 
substitution effect. Like larger bribes, more effective corruption will reduce the costs of evasion. 
Correspondingly, the relative price of declaring income will increase, and a firm will substitute 
away from declared income to undeclared income. Again, it is impossible to determine which 
effect will dominate, so the overall effect of an increase in α on declared income is theoretically 
ambiguous. 
The next section presents our approach for estimating these effects. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Strategy 
3.1. Data 
Our data come from a compilation of survey information from the World Bank. Through 
the first decade of the millennium, the World Bank conducted the World Enterprise Survey 
(WES) and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which are 
polls of individual firms regarding their business environment. The survey questions of interest 
cover over 16,000 firms from 33 different countries; due to missing data, sample sizes for richer 
specifications are closer to 8,000 observations. The descriptions of variables are in Table 1, and 
summary statistics are in Table 2. 
We seek to estimate equation (10), or the determinants of the firm’s optimal amount of 
declared income. The dependent variable follows from a question asking each firm about the 
amount that the “typical” firm in its area reports for tax purposes. Asking a firm directly about its 
own reporting decision is of course likely to result in unreliable responses, as respondents are 
often wary of incriminating themselves or they may wish to present themselves in a positive light 
(Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing 1987). Indirect survey questions seek to limit this misreporting by 
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asking about the behavior of others. The respondent’s answer is assumed to be informed by its 
own experiences, and is thus assumed to be a reasonable proxy for its own behavior. Even so, 
these data are not without potential problems. While the indirect nature of the questions mitigates 
misreporting due to self-presentation reasons, the questions may still be subject to misreporting 
due to a firm’s misperceptions of its own behavior. If the firm does not realize that it is engaging 
in tax evasion, then it cannot report its experience with tax evasion. However, the lack of formal 
high-quality audit data often makes these types of survey data the only way to proceed in 
investigating tax evasion, especially at the firm level. 
Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions 
Variable Description 
rprt_sales Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes 
brib_taxes Bribed to deal with taxes dummy 
brsal_per Total briberyas percentage of sales 
tax_inspec Inspected by tax authorities in past year dummy 
obst_taxreg Tax regulations are an obstacle to business (0-No Obstacle, 3-Major Obstacle) 
obst_hightax Tax rates are an obstacle to business (0-No Obstacle, 3-Major Obstacle) 
obst_corrup Corruption is an obstacle to business (0-No Obstacle, 3-Major Obstacle) 
lnsales Natural log of sales 
Yoper Number of years the firm has been in operation 
Empfull Full time permanent employment 
Listed Legal organization – Listed  
Closed Legal organization – Closed  
Sole Proprietorship Legal organization – Sole Proprietorship  
Partnership Legal organization – Partnership  
Public Sector Legal organization – Public Sector  
Other Legal organization – Other  
Domestic Private Ownership – Domestic Private 
Foreign Private Ownership – Foreign Private 
State Ownership – State 
brib_infra Bribed to deal with infrastructure dummy 
brib_license Bribed to deal with licenses dummy 
brib_contr Bribed to deal with contracts dummy 
VAT Rate Value Added Tax rate 
PIT Rate Personal Income Tax rate 
CIT Rate Corporate Income Tax rate 
gfdddi01 Bank private credit to GDP 
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gfdddm01 Stock market capitalization to GDP 
gfddai01 Bank accounts per 100,000 adults 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
   
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
rprt_sales 16231 88.164 19.918 1 100 
brib_taxes 16231 0.405 0.491 0 1 
brsal_per 16231 1.087 2.603 0 50 
tax_inspec 11009 0.529 0.499 0 1 
obst_taxreg 15925 1.468 1.134 0 3 
obst_hightax 16047 1.685 1.122 0 3 
obst_corrup 15444 1.060 1.138 0 3 
lnsales 12789 6.151 2.110 0 14.509 
Yoper 15058 15.939 17.639 3 202 
Empfull 16213 114.422 440.698 2 9960 
Listed 16231 0.021 0.142 0 1 
Closed 16231 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Sole Proprietorship 16231 0.348 0.476 0 1 
Partnership 16231 0.249 0.433 0 1 
Public Sector 16231 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Other 16231 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Domestic Private 16231 0.793 0.405 0 1 
Foreign Private 16231 0.121 0.326 0 1 
State 16231 0.086 0.280 0 1 
brib_infra 16044 0.250 0.433 0 1 
brib_license 15981 0.441 0.496 0 1 
brib_contr 15333 0.343 0.475 0 1 
VAT Rate 10774 0.188 0.028 0.100 0.250 
PIT Rate 15755 0.022 0.020 0.000 0.084 
CIT Rate 15755 0.024 0.017 0.000 0.084 
gfdddi01 18307 39.671 38.760 3.440 140.970 
gfdddm01 16037 26.102 19.332 0.260 84.020 
gfddai01 5228 1531.961 1182.842 356.520 4279.260 
 
3.2 Empirical Specification 
Following from equation (10), our main econometric specification is: 
 
                                                       
                                     (     )         
(17)  
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where rprt_sales is the percentage of sales a firm declares for tax purposes, brib_taxes is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm has made a bribe to deal with taxes, brsal_per is the 
firm's total bribery payments for tax and other purposes as a percentage of sales, tax_inspec is a 
dummy variable indicating that the firm has been audited within the past year, obst_taxreg and 
obst_hightax are categorical variables measuring how much the firm views tax regulations and 
rates as an obstacle to doing business, and ln(sales) is the natural log of the firm’s sales. The 
vector X contains control variables, including country fixed effects that also control for the tax 
and penalty rate faced by the firm.  Due to data limitations, not all parameters affecting the 
optimal level of income reporting in equation (10) can be explicitly included in the econometric 
specification. Measures of the tax rate τ and penalty rate π are not available, and in any event 
these variables are likely to be defined solely by legal statute. However, as these statutes are 
constant at the country level, a vector of country fixed effects will control for them. Most all 
other factors affecting the firms reporting decision are represented in the data set. 
In particular, the theoretical model identified several main factors that affect the reporting 
decision of the firm in a corrupt environment. The dummy variable taxinspect controls for the 
audit probabilities faced by the firm, and potentially controls for other omitted variables that are 
correlated with both corruption and audit activities. Firm income is measured by the natural log 
of firm sales. The costs of evasion are proxied by the survey questions that ask the firm’s view of 
tax regulations being an obstacle to doing business (obst_taxreg) and of tax rates as an obstacle 
(obst_hightax). While these variables do not measure evasion costs directly, the firm’s view of 
tax regulations and tax rates as obstacles to business contains useful information about these 
costs. The firm’s evasion costs consist of pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. Some pecuniary 
costs typically associated with evasion are the salaries to the accountants and lawyers enabling 
evasion or the bank fees accompanying an account in which gains can be hidden; non-pecuniary 
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or psychological costs arise from the social stigma of tax evasion or the possible embarrassment 
of being caught. Both of these costs can contribute to firms viewing tax regulations/rates as an 
obstacle to business. When a firm faces low costs, it is easier to evade taxes. When taxes are easy 
and cheap to evade, they do not pose a large obstacle to doing business, and a firm will simply 
evade the taxes it needs to evade and move on with business.
4
 However, when costs of evasion 
are high and evasion does not come as easily, taxes are not so lightly dismissed. In this respect, 
taxes increasingly become an obstacle to business as evasion costs increase. 
The two coefficient estimates of most interest are β1 and β2. The variable brib_taxes 
measures the firm’s probability of facing a corrupt tax inspector, and thus represents the q 
variable from equation (10). The variable brsal_per captures information on the amount of the 
bribe for tax evasion (or a firm’s entire bribery load), and thus is a measure of θ. While the 
effectiveness of tax officials in reducing costs α is not specifically controlled for in this 
specification, the country level fixed effects included in the X vector offer some control.  
The effectiveness of officials in reducing evasion costs depends in part on how 
acceptable corruption is in the country. As corruption becomes more common and (presumably) 
more acceptable, corruption becomes more effective at reducing costs associated with evasion. 
For example, a firm engaged in evasion may keep two sets of books; upon being audited by a 
corrupt auditor, the firm can then bribe the auditor to report the cooked books to his superiors, 
thus enabling the evasion. In a society in which corruption is more common, the corrupt 
auditor’s superiors could simply accept the auditor's word that the firm’s books are straight, 
particularly if the superiors gain something from the transaction as well.
5
 This obviates the need 
                                                          
4
 A similar effect has been shown to occur in the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and taxation. 
High levels of corruption attenuate the relationship between tax levels and FDI (Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Zhang 2013). 
5
 A recent case in India illustrates the potential collusion between corrupt tax officials and their superiors. In his 
defense, a corrupt tax official claimed that the bribe “…accepted by him was to be passed on to his senior Nahar and 
was not for his use only” (PTI 2013). 
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for two sets of books; the auditor’s (corrupted) word stands in for the cooked books. Each 
country has its own level of corruption acceptance, and the country fixed effects capture this 
acceptance level. 
3.3. Econometric Issues 
As emphasized in our theoretical discussion, the level of tax corruption in the country in 
which a firm operates affects the amount of tax evasion in which a firm engages, so that 
corruption and evasion are jointly determined. Çule and Fulton (2000) argue that tax evasion by 
firms and corruption by inspectors are complementary activities; that is, while corruption may 
induce more firms to cheat on taxes, more cheating on taxes creates more opportunities for 
bribery of tax officials. This potential endogeneity must be addressed.  
We deal with this potential endogeneity in several ways. In a first strategy, we employ an 
instrumental variable approach. An appropriate instrument for the corruption variables is one that 
is correlated with tax corruption but uncorrelated with tax evasion. One set of variables that 
meets these requirements is the information regarding the firm's other bribery activity. Such 
variables include whether a firm bribed authorities to get connected to infrastructure, to obtain a 
business license, and to obtain a government contract. 
We argue that these variables are suitable instruments, for several reasons. As corruption 
takes root in a society, these types of bribes will grow in conjunction with bribery of tax officials 
to evade taxes. A culture of bribery reduces the stigma and social costs involved with all forms 
of bribery. Further, if a firm is comfortable with bribing for other reasons, then it is unlikely to 
view tax bribery as unacceptable and refuse to engage in it. As a result, the other bribe variables 
meet the first condition for instrumental variables; that is, they are correlated with bribery to deal 
with taxes.  
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Since the bribery activity captured by the instrumental variables does not affect the firm’s 
relationship with the tax authorities, they are also independent of the tax evasion decision 
(Goerke 2008). In a sense, these bribes can be viewed as a cost of doing business similar to the 
wage rate or cost of capital. While such costs affect total income and profits, they do not affect 
the amount of sales to report for tax purposes. As a result, these instruments also meet the second 
condition of instrumental variables. Further, given three instruments (e.g., bribery to deal with 
infrastructure, business licenses and government contracts) and only one endogenous variable, 
the equation is over-identified, which allows for testing of both instrumental variable conditions. 
In a second strategy, we also address potential endogeneity of the corruption variable 
through propensity score matching (DiPrete and Gangl 2004). The event of facing and bribing a 
corrupt tax collector can be viewed as a random treatment that the firm experiences, with the 
subsequent outcome being the amount of sales that are reported for tax purposes. The effect of 
corruption on tax evasion can then be determined by finding the average treatment effect on the 
treated firms (ATT). The effect of the treatment on the outcome is observable on the treated 
firms, and the effect of non-treatment on the outcome is also visible for non-treated firms. 
Denoting declared income Y1 for treated firms and Y0 for non-treated firms, the average treatment 
effect (ATE) can be written: 
      (  |      |   ) (18)  
where E is the expectations operator and C is a dummy variable indicating if the firm faced 
corruption or not. However, due to potential endogeneities, the ATE will not be the same as the 
ATT. The ATT is determined by: 
      (  |      |   )   (     |   ) (19)  
Thus finding the ATT requires observation of the outcomes of the untreated firms when they are 
treated (Y0|C=1), which is of course unobserved. Because the treatment is not necessarily 
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completely random, it is necessary to employ propensity score matching to establish a control 
group for comparison with the treated group. 
The propensity score model first identifies the characteristics that are highly associated 
with treatment. Based on those characteristics, firms that have a high probability of being treated 
but in actuality are not are established as a control group with which the treated group can be 
compared. From this group, the ATT can be measured, giving the effect of corruption on tax 
evasion. 
Since the treatment is partially based on the firm's actions of engaging in bribery, it is 
important to control for a wide range of firm characteristics to account for this potential selection 
bias. We use a number of observable firm characteristics, including firm size in sales and 
employees, ownership and industry type, its attitude toward regulations/rates, and other bribery 
activities in order to identify the untreated firms that would have been likely to fall into the 
treated group in order to establish a control group. Since the firm’s other bribery activity is an 
observable and captures the firm’s attitudes toward corruption, the potential selection bias is 
mitigated. Once this is accounted for, the treatment contains a random element because bribing 
to deal with taxes can only occur if the firm has the chance to be audited by a corrupt official. 
The treatment captures whether a bribe is paid to deal with taxes. A probit regression then gives 
the propensity that a firm engages in bribery based on the observable characteristics. After 
obtaining the fitted values from the probit regression, firms within the control group are matched 
with firms in the treated group based on their propensity scores. The resulting average difference 
in outcomes is the effect of bribing to deal with taxes on tax evasion. 
As emphasized by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), in matching propensity scores there is 
a tradeoff between efficiency and bias depending on what matching method is used for finite 
samples. To address this tradeoff, we use three matching techniques: Nearest Neighbor, Gaussian 
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Kernel, and Epanechikov Kernel matching. Nearest Neighbor matching pairs observations based 
on which propensity scores are closest to one another. The similarity of the propensity scores 
between treated and non-treated observations reduces bias in the comparison; however, the one-
to-one comparison reduces the number of matches between groups, which increases the variance. 
Gaussian and Epanechikov Kernel matching methods address this issue by using a weighted 
average of all control group observations to create a counterfactual for the treatment observation. 
Since all control group observations are used, the variance of the estimate is reduced. However, 
this method can introduce bias as bad matches may be used in the weighting scheme. 
In addition to the potential endogeneity of the tax bribery variable, it is clear from 
equation (4)’ that the size of the bribe, as measured by brsal_per, is determined by both the 
bargaining power of the corrupt official (measured by the parameter  ) and by the level of 
evasion (our dependent variable). As with the tax corruption variable, we use an instrumental 
variable approach to isolate the portion of variation in brsal_per that arises from  . To this end, 
we use the percentage of time that the firm spends on regulations as an instrument for the corrupt 
official’s bargaining power.   
When viewed as a bargaining game, the official’s bargaining power is positively related 
to the level of regulations in two ways. First, many government regulations represent a large 
burden on firms and translate into a high demand for circumvention. In such a situation, corrupt 
officials have more bargaining power, as they can charge a higher price to ease the regulatory 
burden. Additionally, corrupt officials can often impose new regulations of their own, in order to 
increase their bargaining power (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). When corrupt officials have rule-
making power, they can increase a firm’s regulatory compliance costs and extract additional 
payments that “allow” the firm to comply.  Indeed, many rules and regulations may be in place 
only to provide the opportunity for officials to demand bribes (De Soto 1989). Under the 
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assumption that more time spent on regulations is the result of more numerous regulations, our 
chosen instrument would then be positively associated with larger bribes due to more bargaining 
power on part of the corrupt official.  As with the decision to bribe for reasons other than tax 
purposes, the amount of time spent on regulations should not be related to the level of sales 
reported for taxes, and thus meets the orthogonality condition. 
Finally, a third strategy recognizes the jointly endogenous relationship between evasion 
and tax corruption; that is, the firm’s decision to evade and its decision to bribe are jointly 
determined and can be estimated simultaneously.  We have jointly estimated both decisions as 
part of our estimation strategy; because the results are practically unchanged, for space reasons 
the simultaneous estimations are not reported here.
6
 
Note that the dependent variable also presents estimation issues in the OLS case. The 
percentage of sales reported for tax purposes is bounded between 0 and 100, with a large 
proportion (55 percent) of the sample reporting 100 percent of sales. The transformation from a 
continuous distribution (or the actual amount of sales reported for tax purposes) to a limited 
distribution (or the percentage of sales reported) creates obvious issues for conventional 
regression methods (Green 2003). This fractional response can be estimated by a generalized 
linear model with a logistic transformation (Papke and Wooldridge 1993). 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1. Basic Results: IV Analyses 
Table 3 reports first stage regressions for the IV analyses. Column one shows estimates 
from the least squares first stage regression on bribery to deal with taxes. The instruments chosen 
are positively correlated with tax corruption and significant at the 1 percent level. A firm that 
bribes to deal with contracts, licenses, or infrastructure increases the likelihood a firm bribing to 
                                                          
6
  All estimation results are available upon request. 
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deal with taxes by between 18.8 and 28.5 percent. Column two gives the least squares first stage 
estimates for bribe size.  As with the first estimation, the chosen instrument of time spent on 
regulations is positively correlated with bribe size, with an additional percentage point of time 
spent on regulations increasing bribe size by 0.03 percentage points of sales.  
 
Table 3: First Stage Regressions 
Variables brib_taxes brsal_per 
brib_infrastr 0.205*** 0.161* 
 
(0.014) (0.083) 
brib_license 0.294*** 0.482*** 
 
(0.014) (0.067) 
brib_contract 0.204*** 0.561*** 
 
(0.013) (0.071) 
law_govreg 0.000 0.027*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) 
tax_inspec 0.034*** 0.038 
 
(0.010) (0.052) 
obst_taxreg 0.025*** 0.070** 
 
(0.005) (0.029) 
obst_hightax 0.007 0.027 
 
(0.005) (0.028) 
lnsales -0.005* -0.041*** 
 
(0.003) (0.015) 
Yoper -0.000* -0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Closed -0.011 -0.086 
 
(0.037) (0.227) 
Sole Proprietorship -0.004 -0.021 
 
(0.024) (0.187) 
Partnership 0.005 0.042 
 
(0.024) (0.175) 
Public Sector -0.023 -0.168 
 
(0.025) (0.175) 
Other -0.102* -0.170 
 
(0.058) (0.219) 
Foreign Private 0.004 -0.000 
 
(0.014) (0.071) 
State 0.057 -0.126 
 
(0.056) (0.165) 
Constant 0.051 0.640 
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(0.056) (0.447) 
Observations 7,833 7,834 
R-Squared 0.478 0.153 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions 
     Model Controls Extended Controls Tax Controls Financial Controls 
  rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales 
brib_taxes -5.182*** -4.696*** -3.879* -5.660*** 
 
(0.979) (0.851) (1.757) (0.777) 
brsal_per -1.017*** -0.922*** -0.831** -0.740** 
 
(0.211) (0.198) (0.330) (0.280) 
tax_inspec -0.213 -0.417 -0.661 -0.025 
 
(0.859) (0.606) (0.981) (1.185) 
obst_taxreg -0.369 -0.830** -0.618 -0.153 
 
(0.360) (0.352) (0.467) (0.745) 
obst_hightax -0.691* 0.092 0.149 0.066 
 
(0.340) (0.342) (0.539) (0.778) 
lnsales 0.933*** 0.669*** 0.740*** 0.511** 
 
(0.177) (0.104) (0.188) (0.194) 
Yoper 
 
0.002 -0.018 0.007 
  
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) 
Listed 
 
-0.019 -3.335 1.518 
  
(1.341) (2.736) (1.683) 
Closed 
 
-1.485 -5.953*** -0.239 
  
(1.058) (1.751) (1.576) 
Sole Proprietorship 
 
-4.808*** -10.549*** -3.459** 
  
(0.985) (1.852) (1.166) 
Partnership 
 
-3.098** -8.227*** -2.912 
  
(1.307) (1.998) (1.948) 
Public Sector 
 
-8.854 -1.097 -0.137 
  
(8.019) (4.920) (1.766) 
Foreign Private 
 
1.253 0.461 1.845* 
  
(0.856) (1.588) (0.937) 
State 
 
8.456 -2.610 
 
  
(8.870) (4.375) 
 VAT Rate 
  
-62.081 
 
   
(81.436) 
 PIT Rate 
  
136.149 
 
   
(164.604) 
 CIT Rate 
  
-46.590 
 
   
(82.631) 
 gfdddi01 
   
-0.067 
    
(0.119) 
gfdddm01 
   
0.197 
    
(0.203) 
gfddai01 
   
0.007 
    
(0.006) 
Constant 88.973*** 87.497*** 115.208*** 53.939* 
 
(1.779) (2.368) (14.575) (26.209) 
Observations 7,875 7,866 3,495 3,145 
R-squared 0.083 0.159 0.137 0.129 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
x x x 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
x 
  Region Fixed Effects 
  
x x 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
x x 
 Clustered SE X x x x 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10    
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Throughout specifications and estimation methods, corruption on the part of tax officials 
enables tax evasion. Table 4 presents estimates from the main variables of the regression 
analysis. Column one of Table 4 gives results of a base model with only factors from the 
theoretical model included. Corruption and tax evasion are strongly linked, and all measures of 
corruption are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column two presents results with a 
richer set of firm controls, and the addition of these additional firm controls does not affect the 
statistical significance of these results. Column three estimates add the VAT, personal income 
tax, and corporate income tax rates, and column four controls for financial development. Due to 
collinearity issues, these models are estimated with regional fixed effects instead of country fixed 
effects. Importantly, the negative relationship between reported sales and corruption holds.
7
 
In these specifications, tax bribery results in lower sales reporting for tax purposes, with a 
bribe estimated to reduce reported sales by 3.9-5.7 percentage points. Additionally, as the 
amount of bribery increases so does tax evasion. An increase of one percentage point in bribes as 
a percent of sales decreases reported sales by between 0.75 and 1 percentage points.  
The results of the least squares IV analysis are in Table 5. As with the non-IV 
regressions, corruption is shown to be a significant factor in tax evasion. Results in column two 
show that bribing to deal with taxes reduces amount of sales reported for tax purposes by about 5 
percentage points. Larger bribe sizes also result in more evasion, with a decrease of 2.4 
percentage points in reported sales for every additional percentage point of sales paid in bribes.  
However, this effect becomes imprecisely estimated in the final two columns when controls for 
tax rates and financial development are included.  
 
                                                          
7
 While the inclusion of country fixed effects in these models results in the omission of various control variables, the 
results on the variables of interest remain consistent with the results presented.  The omission of country fixed 
effects allows us to examine not only the VAT tax rate, but also the personal income tax and corporate income tax 
rates in the tax rate specifications and all three measures of financial development in those specifications. The 
results with country fixed effects included are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 5: IV Regressions 
     Model Controls Extended Controls Tax Controls Financial Controls 
Variable rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales rprt_sales 
brib_taxes -4.412*** -4.973** -9.868* -3.755 
 
(1.650) (2.132) (5.439) (2.700) 
brsal_per -3.024*** -2.386** 1.599 -2.526 
 
(0.781) (1.135) (3.458) (1.577) 
tax_inspec 0.353 -0.575 -0.618 -0.654 
 
(0.838) (0.404) (0.644) (0.771) 
obst_taxreg -0.112 -0.438* -0.699 -0.007 
 
(0.357) (0.237) (0.463) (0.430) 
obst_hightax -0.591* 0.020 0.388 -0.152 
 
(0.312) (0.230) (0.457) (0.404) 
lnsales 0.739*** 0.632*** 0.907*** 0.449** 
 
(0.189) (0.120) (0.218) (0.199) 
Yoper 
 
0.000 -0.016 0.012 
  
(0.008) (0.016) (0.015) 
Listed 
 
0.324 -3.330 1.171 
  
(1.370) (2.182) (2.207) 
Closed 
 
-1.308 -6.451*** -1.205 
  
(0.998) (1.533) (1.721) 
Sole Proprietorship 
 
-4.401*** -11.482*** -3.664** 
  
(1.003) (1.585) (1.742) 
Partnership 
 
-3.075*** -8.783*** -3.955** 
  
(1.023) (1.600) (1.754) 
Public Sector 
 
0.367 -3.397 -1.911 
  
(1.761) (4.357) (2.203) 
Foreign Private 
 
1.683*** -0.219 2.267** 
  
(0.537) (1.282) (0.882) 
State 
 
-0.713 -0.159 
 
  
(1.685) (4.567) 
 VAT Rate 
  
-135.986 
 
   
(184.426) 
 PIT Rate 
  
365.777 
 
   
(445.206) 
 CIT Rate 
  
34.370 
 
   
(104.427) 
 gfdddi01 
   
-0.031 
    
(0.054) 
gfdddm01 
   
0.101 
    
(0.067) 
gfddai01 
   
0.004* 
    
(0.002) 
Constant 90.946*** 97.842*** 125.012*** 100.468*** 
 
(1.890) (2.312) (28.401) (4.390) 
Observations 7,074 7,749 3,120 2,804 
R-squared 0.025 0.130 0.052 0.073 
Underidentification LM Statistic 13.40 47.72 9.341 17.90 
 LM Statistic P-Value 0.0039 0.0000 0.0251 0.0005 
Weak Identification F Statistic 10.00 11.90 2.230 5.029 
Hansen's J 4.938 2.091 2.362 2.964 
Hansen's P-value 0.0847 0.351 0.307 0.227 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
x x x 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
x 
  Region Fixed Effects 
  
x x 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
x x 
 Robust SE 
 
x x x 
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Clustered SE x       
Table 6: GLM Logit Transformation Regressions 
 Variable Model Controls Extended Controls Tax Controls Financial Controls 
brib_taxes -0.597*** -0.538*** -0.448** -0.692*** 
 
(0.100) (0.094) (0.186) (0.101) 
brsal_per -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.059** -0.057** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.024) 
tax_inspec -0.021 -0.032 -0.083 0.024 
 
(0.104) (0.081) (0.135) (0.148) 
obst_taxreg -0.042 -0.098*** -0.083* -0.014 
 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.047) (0.080) 
obst_hightax -0.099** -0.006 0.016 -0.016 
 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.063) (0.088) 
lnsales 0.126*** 0.098*** 0.115*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
Yoper 
 
0.002 -0.002 0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Listed 
 
0.118 -0.660 0.387 
  
(0.239) (0.489) (0.306) 
Closed 
 
-0.225 -1.172*** 0.050 
  
(0.182) (0.429) (0.213) 
Sole Proprietorship 
 
-0.617*** -1.677*** -0.389*** 
  
(0.165) (0.384) (0.149) 
Partnership 
 
-0.456** -1.450*** -0.337 
  
(0.201) (0.416) (0.234) 
Public Sector 
 
-1.284 8.619*** -0.018 
  
(0.853) (0.931) (0.254) 
Foreign Private 
 
0.222* 0.142 0.298** 
  
(0.128) (0.266) (0.140) 
State 
 
1.213 -9.230*** 
 
  
(1.002) (0.862) 
 VAT Rate 
  
-8.317 
 
   
(6.583) 
 PIT Rate 
  
18.680 
 
   
(19.443) 
 CIT Rate 
  
-8.881 
 
   
(8.373) 
 gfdddi01 
   
-0.003 
    
(0.009) 
gfdddm01 
   
0.018 
    
(0.017) 
gfddai01 
   
0.001 
    
(0.000) 
Constant 2.066*** 3.062*** 5.863*** 2.888*** 
 
(0.230) (0.275) (1.405) (0.746) 
Observations 7,875 7,866 3,495 3,145 
MFX brib_tax -4.927 -4.313 -3.587 -5.506 
MFX brsal_per -0.613 -0.575 -0.469 -0.457 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
x x x 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
x 
  Region Fixed Effects 
  
x x 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
x x 
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Clustered SE x x x x 
Table 7: IV-GLM Logit Transformation Regressions 
 Variable Model Controls Extended Controls Tax Controls Financial Controls 
brib_taxes -0.574*** -0.699*** -1.202** -0.577** 
 
(0.154) (0.223) (0.517) (0.230) 
brsal_per -0.323*** -0.216** 0.186 -0.256** 
 
(0.080) (0.094) (0.245) (0.115) 
tax_inspec 0.041 -0.062 -0.093 -0.058 
 
(0.104) (0.095) (0.155) (0.156) 
obst_taxreg -0.013 -0.067* -0.096** -0.002 
 
(0.043) (0.039) (0.038) (0.088) 
obst_hightax -0.091** -0.011 0.047 -0.042 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.066) (0.090) 
lnsales 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.135*** 0.070** 
 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.031) (0.030) 
Yoper 
 
0.002 -0.002 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Listed 
 
-0.313* -1.228*** -0.143 
  
(0.173) (0.421) (0.164) 
Closed 
 
-0.713*** -1.793*** -0.490*** 
  
(0.173) (0.341) (0.143) 
Sole Proprietorship 
 
-0.570*** -1.520*** -0.526** 
  
(0.189) (0.423) (0.208) 
Partnership 
 
6.601*** 7.246*** -0.251 
  
(0.589) (0.842) (0.309) 
Public Sector 
 
0.002 -0.747 0.249 
  
(0.232) (0.540) (0.239) 
Foreign Private 
 
0.251* 0.063 0.380** 
  
(0.138) (0.238) (0.151) 
State 
 
-6.759*** -7.826*** 
 
  
(0.594) (0.744) 
 VAT Rate 
  
-13.601 
 
   
(10.716) 
 PIT Rate 
  
38.573 
 
   
(36.223) 
 CIT Rate 
  
0.563 
 
   
(4.956) 
 gfdddi01 
   
-0.001 
    
(0.010) 
gfdddm01 
   
0.013 
    
(0.017) 
gfddai01 
   
0.000 
    
(0.000) 
Constant 2.177*** 2.728*** 3.046*** 0.224 
 
(0.263) (0.351) (0.442) (2.117) 
Observations 7,383 7,065 3,120 2,804 
MFX brib_tax -4.536 -5.602 -10.1 -4.457 
MFX brsal_per -2.556 -1.729 1.561 -1.981 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
x x X 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
x 
  Region Fixed Effects 
  
x X 
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Year Fixed Effects 
 
x x 
 Clustered SE x x x X 
Additional instrument validity statistics can be found at the bottom of Table 5. 
Underidentification is strongly rejected with the LM statistic ranging from 9.34 to 47.72 
depending on the specification. Similarly, tax bribery and bribe size are strongly identified by the 
instruments, with the null hypothesis of weak identification test rejected for all specifications. 
These results indicate that the first instrumental variable condition of correlation between the 
instruments and the variable of interest is fulfilled. 
Further, with three separate instruments for tax bribery, the equation is overidentified, 
which allows testing for orthogonality. These estimates produce a Hansen J statistic between 
2.09 and 4.94, which fail to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality at the 5 percent level for 
all specifications and at the 10 percent level for the preferred specification. These results show 
that the chosen instruments are appropriate as they meet both conditions for valid instrumental 
variables. 
Tables 6 and 7 report results of the generalized linear model in which the dependent 
variable is transformed with a logistic function. As with the other results, tax bribery and bribe 
size are associated with less tax reporting, and the magnitudes of the estimates are in line with 
the OLS and IV analyses. The IV-GLM estimates give marginal effects of tax bribery as 
reducing reported income between 4.5 and 10.1 percentage points, with our preferred 
specification giving a marginal effect of a reduction of 5.6 percentage points.  Similarly, bribe 
size is shown to be negative and significant over three of the four specifications (with the fourth 
being imprecisely estimated). A one percentage point increase in the bribes to firm sales ratio 
results in 1.7 percentage point decline in reported sales. 
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While the IV test statistics indicate that the instruments chosen are valid, these results 
could be sensitive to the instruments chosen. To examine this possibility, the IV models are 
estimated using three alternative sets of instruments for tax bribery and one alternative for bribe 
*Please address all correspondence to: James Alm, Department of Economics, Tulane University, 208 Tilton Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118 (email jalm@tulane.edu; 
phone +1 504 862 8344; fax +1 504 865 5869). 
 
Table 8: Alternative Instruments 
  
Extended 
Controls 
Extended 
Controls Extended Controls 
Extended 
Controls 
Extended 
Controls 
Extended 
Controls 
 
IV IV GLM IV IV GLM IV IV GLM 
Variable 
Bribery Is Common/Government 
Regulation 
Bribe Safety, Fire, Environmental 
Inspection/Goverment Regulation 
Bribe for Courts, Customs/Bribe 
Price Is Known/Percent Protestant. 
brib_taxes -6.782** -1.419*** -4.568** -0.633*** -3.430*** -0.177 
 
(3.098) (0.376) (2.044) (0.194) (1.308) (0.215) 
brsal_per -2.639*** -0.147** -3.094** -0.272*** -3.584*** -0.516*** 
 
(0.759) (0.067) (1.276) (0.090) (0.681) (0.119) 
tax_inspec -0.278 -0.003 -0.265 -0.017 -0.228 -0.010 
 
(0.432) (0.092) (0.416) (0.093) (0.419) (0.096) 
obst_taxreg -0.257 -0.021 -0.408* -0.068 -0.580** -0.085* 
 
(0.259) (0.044) (0.246) (0.041) (0.245) (0.047) 
obst_hightax 0.102 0.007 0.055 -0.000 0.233 0.020 
 
(0.233) (0.041) (0.234) (0.047) (0.236) (0.049) 
lnsales 0.642*** 0.106*** 0.614*** 0.101*** 0.608*** 0.097*** 
 
(0.123) (0.019) (0.123) (0.020) (0.123) (0.020) 
Yoper -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.000 
 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Closed -0.018 -0.276 0.198 -0.280 0.602 -0.152 
 
(1.363) (0.175) (1.371) (0.186) (1.417) (0.210) 
Sole Proprietorship -1.229 -0.652*** -1.194 -0.680*** -0.710 -0.564*** 
 
(0.999) (0.177) (1.018) (0.181) (1.117) (0.193) 
Partnership -4.075*** -0.547*** -4.191*** -0.554*** -3.732*** -0.425** 
 
(1.002) (0.200) (1.014) (0.203) (1.111) (0.192) 
Public Sector -3.121*** -1.426* -3.121*** -1.849** -2.536** -1.455 
 
(1.018) (0.795) (1.034) (0.814) (1.117) (0.946) 
Other -7.447 -0.088 -9.649 -0.016 -7.499 0.124 
 
(7.548) (0.236) (9.056) (0.250) (8.022) (0.262) 
Foreign Private 1.228** 0.164 1.327** 0.205 1.429*** 0.246* 
 
(0.568) (0.130) (0.558) (0.130) (0.547) (0.127) 
State 6.822 1.234 8.687 1.603* 7.019 1.269 
 
(7.512) (0.912) (9.012) (0.907) (7.967) (1.086) 
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Constant 91.655*** 1.544*** 97.612*** 2.554*** 97.975*** 2.474*** 
 
(2.311) (0.358) (2.486) (0.364) (2.375) (0.458) 
Observations 7,841 
 
7,981  7,975  
R-squared 0.108 
 
0.089  0.077  
Underidentification LM Statistic 74.79 
 
37.06  138.8  
 LM Statistic P-Value 0 
 
4.48e-08  0  
Weak Identification F Statistic 19.42 
 
9.376  35.93  
Hansen's J for Overidentification 
  
0.857  0.847  
Hansen's P-value 
  
0.651  0.655  
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Country Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Robust SE x x x x x x 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
 
*Please address all correspondence to: James Alm, Department of Economics, Tulane University, 208 Tilton Hall, 
New Orleans, LA 70118 (email jalm@tulane.edu; phone +1 504 862 8344; fax +1 504 865 5869). 
 
 
size. These alternative instrument sets are similar to the chosen instruments in that they measure 
the firm’s bribery perceptions and activities. Table 8 gives the results of these alternative 
instrument specifications. 
The first alternative instrument for tax bribery is the firm’s perception that bribery is 
common.  The second set of instruments for tax bribery includes indicators of the firm’s bribery 
to deal with safety inspections, to deal with fire inspections, and to deal with environmental 
inspections.  The final instruments are two indicators of the firm’s bribery activity, one to deal 
with courts and one to deal with customs and imports that are paired with alternative instruments 
for tax bribery, whether the general bribe price is known or not and the percentage of the 
population that is Protestant.  The first two sets of alternative instruments follow the rational of 
the instruments from the main analyses, or that tax corruption is associated with a culture of 
corruption that does not directly influence the reporting decision.  However, the results of the 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions can be suspect in this case; if one instrument is 
invalid, then all may be invalid (Murray 2006).  To compensate, in addition to alternative 
measures of corruption culture, we include the percentage of population that is Protestant as an 
additional instrument.  A Protestant tradition has been identified as a determinant of corruption 
levels (Treisman 2000), but has no apparent association with tax evasion.  As such, the 
percentage Protestant provides an instrument rooted in historical and religious traditions instead 
of corruption culture and allows us to test the robustness of the Sargan-Hansen tests. 
All sets of alternative instruments, for both IV and GLM-IV estimators, give results 
similar to our main results.  In the two specifications with alternative instruments based only on 
the culture of corruption rational, bribery to deal with taxes and bribes as a percentage of sales 
are both statistically significant, and have magnitudes in line with those in the primary analyses.  
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Including the percentage of the population that is Protestant does not significantly alter the 
results.  Only bribery to deal with taxes, while still negatively associated with reported sales, 
becomes imprecisely estimated in the GLM-IV specification.  This could be due to the nature of 
the Protestant variable, which only varies at the country level and thus does not fully capture 
firm level characteristics.  With the inclusion of the Protestant variable as an instrument, the 
Hansen J statistic remains insignificant; the test fails to reject the null hypothesis that all 
instruments are valid.  This indicates that the instruments based on the culture of corruption are 
valid despite being grounded in the same rational. 
 
4.2. Basic Results: Propensity Score Matching Analyses 
The results of the IV regression analyses are broadly confirmed by the propensity score 
matching analyses. Table 9 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics by whether they 
bribed for tax purposes or not. Differences in means are fairly small, indicating a close 
relationship between the groups and a good likelihood of finding appropriate matches between 
the groups for comparison. The unconditional difference in mean sales reporting is -7.1 
percentage points, with firms that do not bribe reporting 93.3 percent of their sales and firms that 
do bribe reporting only 86.2 percent of their sales.  
The results of the smaller sample propensity score regression (Table 10) show that being 
audited and believe that regulations/taxes are an obstacle to doing business (tax_inpec and 
obst_taxreg/obst_hightax, respectively) are associated with a greater probability of engaging in 
bribery. Tax inspections provide more opportunities for bribery, while ambivalence toward taxes 
reduces the moral costs of tax bribery. More established and foreign private firms (as compared 
to the omitted category of domestic private firms) are less likely to bribe to deal with taxes. 
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Propensity score matching is successful only if appropriate matches can be made between 
treated and untreated observations. To achieve good matches, the propensity scores for both 
*Please address all correspondence to: James Alm, Department of Economics, Tulane University, 208 Tilton Hall, 
New Orleans, LA 70118 (email jalm@tulane.edu; phone +1 504 862 8344; fax +1 504 865 5869). 
 
Table 9: Summary Statistics by Treatment 
Bribed to deal with 
Taxes?   No       Yes     
Variable 
Observatio
ns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation   
Observat
ions Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Differe
nce 
Mining 5246 0.009 0.096 
 
3046 0.010 0.097 0.000 
Construction 5246 0.119 0.324 
 
3046 0.125 0.330 0.006 
Transport/communicati
on 5246 0.069 0.253 
 
3046 0.063 0.242 -0.006 
Trade 5246 0.196 0.397 
 
3046 0.223 0.416 0.027 
Business services 5246 0.122 0.327 
 
3046 0.078 0.268 -0.044 
Hotels/restaurants 5246 0.065 0.246 
 
3046 0.070 0.256 0.005 
Other service 5246 0.089 0.285 
 
3046 0.072 0.259 -0.017 
MF-Food 5246 0.068 0.251 
 
3046 0.118 0.322 0.050 
MF-Textile 5246 0.017 0.129 
 
3046 0.018 0.132 0.001 
MF-Garments 5246 0.044 0.205 
 
3046 0.045 0.207 0.001 
MF-Chemicals 5246 0.011 0.106 
 
3046 0.012 0.111 0.001 
MF-Plastics and rubber 5246 0.006 0.074 
 
3046 0.007 0.085 0.002 
MF-Non-metallic min. 
product 5246 0.013 0.112 
 
3046 0.014 0.118 0.001 
MF-Metals and metal 
product 5246 0.052 0.223 
 
3046 0.053 0.223 0.000 
MF-Machinery and 
equipment 5246 0.056 0.231 
 
3046 0.046 0.209 -0.011 
MF-Electronics 5246 0.006 0.079 
 
3046 0.003 0.057 -0.003 
MF-n.e.c 5246 0.059 0.235 
 
3046 0.045 0.207 -0.014 
Listed 5246 0.021 0.142 
 
3046 0.015 0.123 -0.005 
Closed 5246 0.319 0.466 
 
3046 0.244 0.430 -0.075 
Sole Proprietorship 5246 0.327 0.469 
 
3046 0.398 0.490 0.071 
Partnership 5246 0.235 0.424 
 
3046 0.265 0.441 0.030 
Public Sector 5246 0.067 0.251 
 
3046 0.045 0.207 -0.023 
Other 5246 0.032 0.175 
 
3046 0.033 0.179 0.002 
Domestic Private 5246 0.009 0.096 
 
3046 0.857 0.350 0.848 
Foreign Private 5246 0.119 0.324 
 
3046 0.098 0.298 -0.020 
State 5246 0.069 0.253 
 
3046 0.044 0.206 -0.025 
tax_inspec 5246 0.434 0.496 
 
3046 0.647 0.478 0.213 
obst_taxreg 5246 1.213 1.137 
 
3046 1.764 1.046 0.551 
obst_hightax 5246 1.483 1.161 
 
3046 1.908 1.025 0.425 
Empfull 5246 100.440 357.527 
 
3046 
81.73
4 284.266 -18.706 
lnsales 5246 6.700 2.100 
 
3046 6.081 1.963 -0.619 
Yoper 5246 18.355 18.801 
 
3046 
14.46
8 15.482 -3.886 
rprt_sales 5246 93.265 14.114   3046 
86.20
1 18.985 -7.064 
 
types of observations must share a common support. Figure 1 shows the common support 
between firms engaging in bribery and those which do not for the small sample matching. The 
distribution of the treatment group is nearly uniform across propensity scores, while untreated  
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Figure 1: Common Support 
 
firms are positively skewed with a majority having low propensity scores. However, both 
distributions completely overlap, providing close matches between groups across the entire range 
of propensity scores.  
Table 11 provides the results of the propensity score matching. These results again show 
that the entire sample of treated and untreated firms is on-support for both the large and the small 
samples. The difference in average percentage of sales reported for taxes before matching, -6.5 
for the small sample and -8.8 for the large sample, is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. After matching, while the average difference falls, the difference is still significant across 
matching techniques and sample sizes. In the small sample, the matched mean difference in 
reported sales between the two groups is between -4.4 and -4.6 percentage points. The large 
sample shows similar results, with matched mean differences between -7.4 and -8.0 percentage 
points. 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
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Table 10: Propensity Score Estimations, Alternative Samples 
  Small Sample Large Sample 
Variables brib_taxes brib_taxes 
tax_inspec 0.193*** 
 
 
(0.034) 
 obst_taxreg 0.220*** 
 
 
(0.018) 
 obst_hightax 0.042** 
 
 
(0.019) 
 lnsales 0.005 
 
 
(0.011) 
 Empfull -0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 Yoper -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Closed 0.103 0.130** 
 
(0.119) (0.060) 
Sole Proprietorship 0.138 0.185*** 
 
(0.121) (0.060) 
Partnership 0.143 0.158*** 
 
(0.121) (0.060) 
Public Sector -0.404 -0.285 
 
(0.573) (0.283) 
Other 0.091 0.216*** 
 
(0.142) (0.072) 
Foreign Private -0.091* -0.066** 
 
(0.051) (0.031) 
State 0.240 -0.024 
 
(0.566) (0.280) 
Constant -0.038 0.467*** 
 
(0.248) (0.133) 
Observations 9,169 18,939 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
   
These results show that firms that engage in bribery will typically report fewer sales for 
tax purposes. Further, these results are similar in magnitude and significance to the earlier IV 
regression results, which show that bribery reduces the percentage of sales reported by around 5 
percentage points. 
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Table 11: Propensity Score Estimates, Alternative Matching Estimators 
  Unmatched 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel – 
Gaussian 
Kernel - 
Epanechnikov 
Small Sample – Extended Matching Controls 
    Treated 86.225 86.225 86.225 86.304 
Controls 92.691 90.628 90.807 90.706 
Difference -6.466 -4.402 -4.581 -4.402 
Standard Error 0.369 0.735 0.493 0.545 
t-statistic -17.500 -5.990 -9.290 -8.070 
On-Support 8,855 8,855 8,855 8,831 
     
Large Sample – Limited Matching Controls 
    Treated 81.288 81.288 81.288 81.288 
Controls 90.084 89.252 88.674 88.682 
Difference -8.797 -7.965 -7.386 -7.395 
Standard Error 0.311 0.553 0.358 0.374 
t-statistic -28.260 -14.400 -20.620 -19.770 
On-Support 18,939 18,939 18,939 18,939 
 
Both the regression and matching analyses support our theoretical predictions in which 
firms decrease reported sales as the probability of facing a corrupt tax administrator increases. 
Additionally, the regression analysis shows that the ambiguous theoretical result on bribe size is 
nonlinear as well. Evasion first increases with bribe costs as firms can evade more if they pay 
more. However, once the costs of bribery become too great, firms will rather report their income 
than incur those bribery cost and evasion falls.  
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4.3. Intensive and Extensive Margins 
In our theoretical framework, a firm assesses the probability of facing a corrupt tax 
administrator and then choses the optimal amount of evasion in which to engage. Two similar 
firms, facing the same audit and corruption probabilities, will choose similar evasion levels. A 
corrupt audit will not affect the chosen level of evasion as the firms have optimally chosen their 
evasion levels. However, if corruption is not a driver of evasion or if evasion enables corruption, 
then evasion levels are chosen independently of bribery opportunities. In this case, the two 
similar firms will still chose the similar initial evasion levels, but when one encounters a corrupt 
official it will change its evasion level in response to the corruption. As such, examining a firm’s 
evasion behavior at the “intensive margin” (by how much does evasion occur) and the “extensive 
margin” (does evasion occur or not occur) provides additional insight into the role of corruption 
on evasion. 
To examine the intensive margin, the IV and GLM-IV analyses presented above are 
conducted only on firms reporting that they engaged in evasion.
8
 By excluding all firms that did 
not evade their tax liability, only the response of the level of evasion to corruption is measured. 
If corruption creates changes at this intensive margin, it would indicate that the decision to evade 
is independent of corruption. 
To examine the extensive margin, a binary variable is created to indicate if the firm has 
reported 100 percent of its sales or has engaged in evasion by reporting less than 100 percent of 
sales; that is, the variable equals 1 if  the firm is honest and 0 if the firm is dishonest. This 
variable is then used as the dependent variable in logit and IV-logit estimations. By consolidating 
all evading firms into one category, this analysis focuses on only the extensive margin.  If 
                                                          
8
 Only the GLM-IV results from the first set of instruments, “bribery to deal with infrastructure”, “bribery to deal 
with licenses”, and “briber to deal with contracts”, are presented.  The other instrumental variable sets give similar 
results, and are available from the authors upon request. 
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corruption creates changes at the extensive margin, then this would suggest that corruption drives 
evasion. 
Table 12: Intensive and Extensive Margins 
    Intensive Margin Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Extensive Margin 
 
OLS GLM-IV Logit IV-Logit 
  rprt_sales rprt_sales honest honest 
brib_taxes -0.002 0.423** -0.857*** -1.611*** 
 
(0.008) (0.188) (0.138) (0.374) 
brsal_per -0.002 -0.200** -0.152*** -0.127 
 
(0.002) (0.082) (0.028) (0.161) 
tax_inspec -0.004 -0.050 -0.057 -0.033 
 
(0.011) (0.079) (0.090) (0.108) 
obst_taxreg -0.001 -0.020 -0.149*** -0.078* 
 
(0.005) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) 
obst_hightax 0.002 0.032 -0.019 -0.048 
 
(0.005) (0.036) (0.056) (0.057) 
lnsales 0.008*** 0.043*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.002) (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) 
Yoper 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Listed -0.017 -0.291 -0.288 -0.345* 
 
(0.016) (0.224) (0.224) (0.209) 
Closed -0.042** -0.446* -0.754*** -0.830*** 
 
(0.018) (0.236) (0.184) (0.187) 
Sole Proprietorship -0.032* -0.436* -0.507** -0.572*** 
 
(0.017) (0.233) (0.220) (0.206) 
Partnership -0.254*** -0.517* -0.793 7.932*** 
 
(0.028) (0.269) (0.972) (0.625) 
Public Sector -0.047* -0.517 0.424 0.379 
 
(0.024) (0.314) (0.268) (0.261) 
Foreign Private 0.003 0.051 0.327** 0.344** 
 
(0.019) (0.122) (0.149) (0.160) 
State 0.183*** 
 
1.114 -7.743*** 
 
(0.031) 
 
(1.122) (0.652) 
Constant 0.614*** 1.146*** 1.499*** 1.052* 
 
(0.036) (0.397) (0.500) (0.543) 
Observations 3,035 2,654 7,866 7,065 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x 
Country Fixed Effects x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Clustered SE x x x x 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10    
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The results from the intensive and extensive margin analysis are presented in Table 12.  
The first two columns detail the IV and GLM-IV results of the intensive margin analysis.  Tax 
bribery is not significant in the IV analysis; however, bribery is positive and significant in the 
GLM-IV analysis, with bribery resulting in a 0.4 percentage point increase in sales reported.  
This is perhaps indicative of the increased marginal cost of evasion when a firm that has already 
set a course of evasion must also pay a corrupt official it has encountered on that course.   
However, there is still some evidence that firms engage in negotiations with the corrupt official 
as bribe size remains a significant factor in determining evasion levels, with larger bribers 
resulting in more evasion. 
In contrast, the results of the extensive margin analyses indicate that corruption plays a 
significant role in the decision to engage in evasion in the first place. Bribery to deal with taxes 
plays a significant and negative role in the decision to remain honest and to report 100 percent of 
tax liability in both the logit and IV-logit estimations. These results indicate that corruption can 
induce a firm to engage in evasion, as suggested by our theoretical analysis. 
In short, it appears that high levels of corruption create more tax evaders. However, 
corruption does not induce tax evaders to engage in more evasion than they would have 
otherwise. The negative marginal effects of corruption on sales reporting come primarily from 
firms making the rational choice to evade and setting their optimal evasion levels in light of 
existing corruption rates. Our results therefore suggest that corruption creates more cheaters 
instead of making existing cheaters worse. This may be particularly worrisome as widespread tax 
evasion could be more harmful than limited but severe tax evasion. 
 
5. Conclusions 
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While corruption and tax evasion can exist separately, they can easily become entangled. 
Corruption enables tax evasion by making it easier for taxpayers to hide their income, while tax 
evasion can contribute to corruption by creating additional opportunities for corruption to thrive. 
Policymakers must understand the relationship between the problems. Our basic estimation 
results provide consistent evidence that corruption is a driver of evasion. 
Our estimation results indicate that corruption of tax officials is a statistically and 
economically significant determinant of tax evasion. Tax inspectors who request bribes result in 
reduction of sales reported for taxes of between 4 and 10 percentage points. Additionally, larger 
bribes result in higher levels of evasion. These results give support to the argument that tax 
compliance is dependent on the quality of the tax enforcers. Corruption effectively negates any 
reduction in evasion from establishing higher audit rates and penalties, the traditional 
enforcement measures used to increase compliance rates. Rules do not matter if no one bothers to 
enforce them. As a result, policymakers cannot attack tax evasion and expect results without 
addressing potential corruption issues first. 
These results indicate that governments seeking to increase their tax revenues should first 
ensure that their tax administration is honest. Corrupt tax administrations not only cause tax 
shortfalls through increased evasion on part of the taxpayers, but they can also appropriate some 
portion the collected taxes due to the government. An honest tax administration enforces the 
existing tax laws, effectively reducing evasion and remitting all tax collections to the 
government. Addressing corruption can ameliorate both corruption (directly) and tax evasion 
(indirectly). Additionally, an honest tax administration allows policymakers to pursue a variety 
of other tax reforms designed to reduce evasion with the confidence that those reforms will be 
properly implemented. 
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